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The North Carolina Time Share Act
Whether motivated by the desire for a less expensive vacation, a second
home, a hedge on inflation, or a calculated investment, over a quarter-million
Americans last year each paid between four thousand and twenty-five thou-
sand dollars for a week of vacation time during each of the next five, ten,
thirty, or more years.' Developers in over 900 resort spots sold each unit to as
many as fifty purchasers, at profits far greater than those on traditional condo-
minium sales.2 Consequently, resort timesharing has become the fastest grow-
ing sector of the vacation and resort industries. With sales increasing from
fifty million dollars in 1975 to an estimated one and one-half billion dollars in
1983, 3 timesharing has grown from a clever innovation to a self-contained in-
dustry, with numerous variations, 4 questionable sales practices, and a maze of
regulatory controls.5
With the North Carolina Time Share Act of 1983,6 North Carolina be-
came the fourteenth state to pass an act directly regulating the timeshare in-
dustry.7 Although such legislation varies considerably from state to state,
North Carolina's differs from the majority in one most significant feature: it
has declared all forms of timeshares, "whether or not coupled with a freehold
estate or an estate for years,"'8 to be interests in real property.9 After briefly
describing the development of timesharing and its various forms, this note fo-
cuses on the methods employed in controlling timeshare sales and operation,
and discusses the ramifications of North Carolina's Act.
A classic example of the ingenuity of the entrepreneur, timeshares devel-
oped in response to the needs of both vacation home suppliers and consumers.
The inflationary costs of land and construction in the early 1970s and the in-
creasing administrative expenses of complying with condominium regula-
tions10 had led to declining profit margins for condominium developers." By
employing the "basic principle of subdivision economics" through timeshar-
1. Daniels, When a Week is Realty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 12, at 51, col. 3. In addition
to the purchase price of $4,000 to $25,000, the timeshare owner must pay yearly maintenance and
facility fees, maid service fees, and taxes. Id at 51, col. 2.
2. Id at 52, col. 4. This is true despite the additional costs incurred in selling the same unit
50 times.
3. Id
4. See infra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Time Sharing, 57 OR. L. REv. 31 (1977).
6. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis Serv. 401 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-39 to -57 (Cum.
Supp. 1983)).
7. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia also have timeshare acts. For statutory
cites, see infra note 85.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
9. Id § 93A-42.
10. See infra note 77. Condominium sales also are often considered sales of securities, and
subjected to additional regulatory requirements. See Note, New Ideas in the Vacation Home Mar-
ket, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1203, 1205-10 (1974).
11. Roodhouse, Fractional Time Period Ownership of Recreational Condominiums, 4 REAL
ESTATE LJ. 35, 38 (1975).
ing, these developers expected to offset their lost profits by selling "parts" of
the condominiums for an aggregate amount greater than the whole. 12
At the same time timeshares met an increasing consumer demand. Be-
cause of increased leisure and mobility 13 and the need to escape urban nui-
sances, 14 more middle-class Americans were seeking vacation retreats
formerly reserved for the wealthy. The timeshare offered an affordable and
flexible form of second-home ownership. With multiple ownership of a unit,
purchasers could resolve the affordability problems of condominium owner-
ship while getting exactly what they needed, a "place of their own" for a lim-
ited period each year.' 5 The practical problems encountered with group
purchases of vacation homes could be avoided by employing professional
managers to handle scheduling and maintenance. 16 Finally, timeshare plans
often enabled purchasers to trade timeshares with owners in other places, fur-
ther increasing the popularity of timesharing.
A timeshare is the prepurchase of a week's exclusive use' 7 of a resort
apartment or suite 8 each year for a period ranging from five years to the
useful life of the dwelling, or for perpetuity. For descriptive and sometimes
regulatory purposes timeshares can be divided into two categories--"fee" and
"right-to-use" timeshares.' 9 The fee timeshare includes the light to use a unit
coupled with an ownership interest in that unit; a right-to-use timeshare in-
volves simply the right to use a unit either by lease or contract, with no owner-
ship interest. 20
Four types of fee timeshares correspond to four alternatives for conveying
the interest. 21 A "timespan" estate is held by all the weekly owners of a given
12. Id at 38. Even though the costs of marketing a timeshare project are up to 50% higher
than for conventional condominiums, the most expensive part, construction, costs no more. Id at
39. It is estimated that revenues from a timeshare project may be from two and one-half to three
times higher than from condominiums. Pollack, Time-Sharing, or Time Is Money But Will It
Sell?, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 281, 287 (1982).
13. Roodhouse, supra note 11, at 36. See also Note, supra note 10, at 1203-04.
14. Note, supra note 10, at 1203.
15. Id at 1210.
16. Gray, Pioneering the Concept of Time-Sharing Ownershp, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1196,
1197-98 (1974).
17. How the period or conditions of the exclusive use is defined varies greatly. North Caro-
lina, for example, defines a timeshare as "a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during
five or more separated time periods over a period of at least five years, including renewal options."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
18. Timeshares are found not only in resort condominiums, but have expanded to "marinas,
recreational vehicle parks, and even to campgrounds, and cities." Daniels, supra note 1, at 52, col.
4.
19. Labels for classifications of timeshares vary; "fee" and "right-to-use," as well as other
labels used in this note are the most commonly used designations. This multiplicity of nomencla-
ture is one of the primary sources of confusion in the timeshare industry.
20. The proportion of fee and right-to-use timeshare sales is close to 50-50. AM. LAND DEV.
ASS'N, RESORT TIME-SHARING FACT SHEET (Oct. 1981).
21. For a complete analysis of the benefits and detriments of each form of fee timeshare, see
generally Comment, Time-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32 ME. L. REV.
181 (1980); E. Peirce & R. Mann, Time Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical Evaluation of the
Regulatory Environment 4-29 (1983) (unpublished article from the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, School of Business Administration); Pollack, supra note 12, at 284-85.
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unit as tenants in common, each having a present undivided interest in a fee
simple estate.2 2 As a supplement to the deed, a timeshare declaration is re-
corded, with restrictive covenants giving each owner the exclusive right to pos-
session for an established period each year.23 With the second form, the
"interval" estate, an estate for years is deeded to each purchaser, with title
rotating among the owners; the possessory rights are determined by the rotat-
ing title rather than by a separate document. 24 The deed also vests a remain-
der in the purchasers as fee simple tenants in common.25 The third form, the
"fee simple" timeshare, grants each purchaser fee simple ownership for a
given period each year.26 Although this form avoids the complications of ten-
ancy in common 27 and interval ownership, 28 it adds the unfamiliar dimension
of time to fee simple ownership, which traditionally has been limited to
dimensions of breadth, depth, and height.2 9 Because of its novelty, fee simple
timesharing may cause confusion in drafting conveyances and infringe the
right to waste, an incident of fee simple ownership. 30 Because it defies these
conventional property law concepts, fee simple timesharing has been used cau-
tiously and infrequently.3' The fourth and newest form of fee timeshare own-
ership is the timeshare "cooperative," under which the purchasers own stock
in a corporation that grants individual use periods through proprietary
leases.32 Although this form is not yet widely used, it "appears to have advan-
tages in the areas of financing, taxation, and regulation. '33
The "vacation license" is the oldest of three widely-used types of right-to-
use timeshares.34 "Developed primarily as a mechanism to avoid real estate
22. See Comment, supra note 21, at 184-85.
23. Id at 186-91.
24. Id at 201-02.
25. Id "At the end of the recurring estates for years, the owners can either reinstate the
interval arrangement or seek partition of their interests." Id at 201 n.35.
26. Id at 211. The fee simple timeshare originally was noted in Roodhouse, supra note 1I, at
41 & nn.19-20.
27. Common problems with tenancy in common include partitioning, allocating the tax bur-
den, enforcing the payment of taxes, and obtaining title insurance. For a complete treatment of
these problems, see generally sources listed in supra note 21.
28. Problems of interval ownership stem from its similarity to a landlord-tenant arrangement
and from the possibility of merger of title. As an estate for years, interval ownership might be
treated under the special laws of landlords and tenants, implying developer liability for tort, war-
ranty of habitability, and a nonequity interest for the purchaser. Comment, supra note 21, at 202,
204. Although a fee simple remainder might lessen the possibility of landlord-tenant treatment, it
raises the possibility for merger of the lesser estate into the greater estate, eliminating the
timeshare portion of the grant altogether. Id at 207-10. For a more complete treatment of these
issues, see generally sources listed in supra note 21.
29. Roodhouse, supra note 11, at 48-50.
30. Id at 50-51.
31. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 16.
32. PRACTICING LAW INST., THE LEGAL AsPECTs OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 14 (1982).
33. Id While the Institute does not describe these advantages, this form of ownership would
avoid the problems of joint liability for financing and taxes.
34. The North Carolina Act mentions several other forms of right-to-use timeshares-pre-
paid hotel reservations, limited partnerships, and vacation bonds-which are not described in the
literature on timeshares. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The constant develop-
ment of variations on the timesharing concept is evidenced by the fact that these forms of
timeshares were not common when the literature was written.
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regulatory agencies and the necessity of using licensed real estate salesmen,"
this form gives the purchaser the right to use a given unit for a specified por-
tion of each year, for either a number of years or for the useful life of the
unit.3 5 The second form, the "vacation lease," gives the purchaser a leasehold
interest in the unit for a specified period each year; unlike the license form, the
vacation lease may be assigned, transferred, or subleased.3 6 The final form of
right-to-use timeshares is the "club membership," in which the purchaser pays
a membership fee to a club or association that owns and operates the premises
and leases timeshares to the members.
3 7
The numerous existing schemes for timesharing, and the likelihood that
even more variations will evolve, illustrate the need for legislation governing
the sale and operation of timeshares. Commentators have suggested legisla-
tion to protect consumers and establish guidelines for timeshare developers
and managers since early in the development of the timeshare industry.
38
Consumer protection legislation was necessary to combat the questionable
sales techniques employed, 39 such as "bait and switch," 40 deceptive prize of-
fers, and nondisclosure of fine print contract provisions, as well as the confu-
sion caused by the multiple forms of timesharing.4 1 In addition, guidance was
needed for the special management requirements of timeshares-scheduling
and overseeing use and possession of, ensuring the maintenance of, and coor-
dinating the insurance and tax payments on each unit.42 Other legal problems
of timesharing, including tort and tax liability among owners, partition of
units, property rights of timeshare purchasers in registration and transfer of
interests, and the status of timeshares under securities regulation, also require
legislative resolution. Finally, it was believed that "widespread market accept-
ance and legal soundness [of timeshares] might be greatly enhanced" by
amending existing legislation to account for timesharing,43 or passing specific
legislation to govern timesharing.44
Both the federal government and various state governments have recog-
nized the need to protect consumers and guide timeshare operations through
regulation of the timeshare industry.45 Unfortunately, the regulations vary
35. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 22.
36. Pollack, supra note 12, at 285. The vacation lease commonly has been accepted as a
leasehold interest in real estate and thus may be unaffected by North Carolina's declaration that
all timeshares are real property interests. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
37. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 26.
38. Altro, Resort Time-Sharing: Why Real Estate's New Brainchild Needs its Own Legislation,
41 LA REVUE Du BARREAU DU QUEBEC 1054, 1086 (1981). See generally Roodhouse, supra note
11.
39. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 63.
41. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
42. Roodhouse, supra note 11, at 52-54.
43. Id at 52.
44. See generally Altro, supra note 38.
45. Although the most relevant federal legislation is discussed elsewhere in this note, see infra
notes 47-50, 60-65, 69-73 and accompanying text, several other federal acts might also affect
timeshares. These include: Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691(f) (1976) (re-
quires those who "regularly extend credit" to make certain disclosures regarding the cost of in-
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widely among the states both in extent of coverage and regulatory methods,
causing unnecessary confusion for both developers and purchasers. Even
within a state, the inability to classify timeshares in an existing regulatory cate-
gory, such as securities, consumer sales practices, or real estate, has led to an
environment of "potential and actual regulation [that] often results in conflict-
ing and irreconcilable requirements. '46 An examination of this regulatory en-
vironment illustrates this confusion.
One form of regulation that might apply to timeshares at both the state
and federal level is securities regulation. Although the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has not required registration of timeshare projects,
nor planned any "definitive action" such as guidelines or no-action letters, it
has not specifically exempted timeshares from its authority.47 The SEC has
issued guidelines for condominiums and other real estate securities that also
might be used for timeshares. 48 Condominiums, when coupled with renting
services for the purchaser, are included in the SEC definition of a "security,"
which emphasizes the purchaser's economic gains derived from a third party's
efforts.49 Timeshares might be distinguished, however, since the services pro-
vided are not so much for the purchasers' economic benefits as for their own
use and enjoyment. Federal cases imply that most timeshares fall outside SEC
control since purchases of commodities "for personal consumption or living
quarters for personal use" are excluded from its "investment contract" defini-
tion of securities.50
The majority of states, including North Carolina, apply the investment
contract definition to their own "blue sky" laws. 51 This theory, however, is
stallment credit); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1976) (prohibits
discrimination in extension of credit based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, mari-
tal status, or source of income); Civil Rights Act of 1964, title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-(6)
(1976) (prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origins); Federal Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2414 (1976) (availability of insurance
dependent on compliance with certain construction standards in flood prone areas; as of October,
1983, federal flood insurance was not available for structures on "undeveloped" coastal barriers);
Civil Rights Act of 1968, title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin). For a more de-
tailed discussion of these laws as they apply to timeshares, see Bloch, Regulation of Timesharing,
60 U. DET. J. URB. L. 23 (1982).
46. Gunnar, supra note 5, at 32-33. For example, a potential conflict between real estate laws
and securities laws may require dual licensing of timeshare salespersons or multiple public offer-
ing statements. For a complete treatment of regulatory mechanisms and examples of possible
confusion, see id at 40-43. See also E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 48-65.
47. Bloch, supra note 45, at 37-38.
48. Id at 38.
49. Id at 38 & n.105.
50. In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme Court held
that the purchasers of "shares" in a cooperative housing project were not buying stock in the
ordinary sense, to make a profit, but rather to acquire low-cost housing. This motive precluded
the cooperative stock from being considered an investment contract under the test set forth in
S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Under this test, a purchaser must invest in a
common enterprise with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or some
third party. Id at 298-99. For a more complete treatment of the securities issue in timesharing,
see Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing: A More Effective Approach, 29 UCLA L. Rnv.
907, 911-33 (1981-82).
51. Bloch, supra note 45, at 34 & n.91. As of 1982, 35 states had adopted the Uniform Secur-
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applied only if the legislation does not specify its own applicability or inappli-
cability. Several states expressly include52 or exclude 53 timeshares from blue
sky coverage or limit the coverage to real estate54 or nonreal estate5 5 interests.
North Carolina has chosen to apply its securities laws to the extent that
timeshares are deemed investment contracts;56 thus, while leaving open the
possibility of securities regulation for timeshares, it has not expressly included
or excluded them. Although some favor applying blue sky legislation to
timeshares because of its broad concept of fraud, wider range of civil reme-
dies, and greater authority for substantive regulation,57 "[t]he consensus
among commentators is that securities laws should not apply to most time
share offerings." s5 8 Although treating timeshares as securities might be desira-
ble when no other laws apply, such regulation may create an unnecessary
overlap of authority when specific legislation could perform the same function
more efficiently.59
A second area of regulation involves the prohibition of unfair and fraudu-
lent sales practices. This type of state and federal legislation addresses the
sales and promotion techniques of timeshare developers, a major complaint of
prospective timeshare purchasers. Alleged "misrepresentation of gifts and
prizes offered, misrepresentation of the purpose of the solicitation, failure to
disclose material facts about the offering, 'high pressure' sales, and even 'ver-
bal abuse' of consumers," have resulted in lawsuits, adverse publicity, and leg-
islative and administrative attention.60 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has informally assisted potential purchasers of timeshares by preparing
a consumer checklist for timeshare offerings. 6 1 It also investigates timeshare
promoters and sellers for "unfair methods of competition or unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices; ' 62 these investigations have led to at least one court ac-
tion.63 A further regulatory provision applicable to timeshares64 is the holder-
ities Act, which applies the "investment contract" definition of security. Id In North Carolina
both the Securities Act and the Time Share Act refer to investment contracts. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 78A-2(l 1) (1981) (definition of "security" includes "investment contract"); Id § 93A-50
(Cum. Supp. 1983) ("time shares deemed to be investment contracts" are subject to securities laws
in addition to real estate laws).
52. These states include Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, and New York. Smith, Timesharing Reg-
ulation by States, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1982, at 34.
53. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 94.813 (1983).
54. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.33(B) (Page 1978 & Supp. 1982) (securities regula-
tions applicable to out-of-state real property).
55. Maryland, for example, might classify some timeshares as "limited use resort securities"
subject to its blue sky laws. Bloch, supra note 45, at 28 n.48.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-50 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
57. Gunnar, supra note 5, at 45; see also Comment, supra note 50, at 930-31.
58. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 36. See also MODEL TIME-SHARE SALES AcT § 1-
106 (Fourth Draft, October 1982) (National Time Sharing Council of the Am. Land Dev. Ass'n)
(timeshare not a security unless the income of the project goes directly to timeshare owners) [here-
inafter cited as MTSA].
59. See infra notes 85-113 and accompanying text.
60. Bloch, supra note 45, at 30-31.
61. I d at 41.
62. Id The authority for these investigations is section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
63. F.T.C. v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, 2 TIMESHARING L. REP. (LDI) 11-7 (No. C81160
13611984] PROPERT Y
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in-due-course rule, which requires "that consumer credit contracts used in fi-
nancing the retail purchase of consumer goods or services specifically preserve
the consumer's rights against the seller." 65
Most states have similar regulations governing fraud, monopolies, and
consumer protection that permit actions for misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
and "high pressure" sales tactics.66 For example, section 75-1.1 of the North
Carolina General Statutes parallels the FTC Act,67 and the North Carolina
Time Share Act expressly requires developers to comply with chapter 75 when
their timeshare promotions include offers of prizes.68
Another type of timeshare regulation involves controls on the subdivision
and sale of land. The Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of
1968,69 which requires registration of land marketed or sold in interstate com-
merce and provides remedies for victims of fraud and misrepresentation, may
apply to timeshares. Although a federal court has upheld application of this
Act to right-to-use "camping clubs,"70 the Act exempts land that already has
been improved or on which a building is scheduled to be built within two
years, 71 as well as land subject to certain other statutory registration and dis-
closure requirements. 72 Although these provisions would exempt many
timeshares from the Act's coverage, others that include the "right to exclusive
use of a specific portion of land" would be covered. 73
At the state level, inclusion of timeshares under similar land sales and
subdivision acts often depends on whether they are considered an interest in
real estate; thus, some states include fee timeshares under these laws, but ex-
V, W.D. Wash., filed Sept. 28, 1981) (involves alleged "bait and switch" tactics by timeshare
developers, sales organization, and owners association in misrepresenting the availability of Ha-
waiian timeshares to purchasers and then offering only units in Tahoe, Nevada and Ocean Shores,
Washington). Discussed in Dickerson, Litigating Resort Timeshare Abuses, NAT'L L.J., June 7,
1982, at 44.
64. Bloch, supra note 45, at 44-45.
65. FTC Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1982). The holder-in-due-course rule requires a
boldface statement of the consumer's rights on the contract. Id.
66. Bloch, supra note 45, at 30-31.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981). See supra note 62. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303,
218 S.E.2d 342 (1975) ("close parallel" to FTC Act); Pedwell v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 51 N.C.
App. 236, 275 S.E.2d 565 (1981) (§ 75-1.1 applied to an agreement to prevent performance of
contracts to purchase condominium); Kent v. Humphries, 50 N.C. App. 580, 275 S.E.2d 176
(rental of spaces in mobile home park is "trade and commerce"), aft'das modfied, 303 N.C. 675,
281 S.E.2d 43 (1981); Kleinfelter v. Northwest Bldrs. & Developers, 44 N.C. App. 561, 261 S.E.2d
498 (1980) ("close parallel to FTC Act"); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574
(1977) (rental of housing is "trade or commerce"), disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843,
844 (1978).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-46 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
70. See Bloch, supra note 45, at 46.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
72. Id § 1702(b). Subdivisions involving purely intrastate activity or those meeting local
minimum standards for subdivisions, zoning, and utility provision, and assuring marketable title,
personal inspection of the property, and involving no prize offers are excluded. Id.
73. Bloch, supra note 45, at 48.
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empt right-to-use units. 7 4 Also, some state acts apply only to vacant land 75 or
to land on which there is no contractual obligation to build within two years. 76
Other state laws, such as those requiring timeshare salespersons to have real
estate licenses or including timeshares under condominium statutes, also often
distinguish between fee and nonfee timeshares. 77
Among states that have not expressly excluded right-to-use timeshares
from land subdivision or real estate licensing acts, the courts are split over
whether they are real property interests. In State v. Carriage House Associ-
ates,78 the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the state land sales act did
not apply to a right-to-use timeshare. In so finding, the court cited with ap-
proval the lower court's opinion that although the right-to-use timeshare is
"really -an anomaly. . . [that] doesn't fit neatly into any nice legal terminol-
ogy,. . . an individual entering into the contract [does not acquire] an interest
in real estate." 79 Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that vacation
club timeshares were not subject to the state's subdivision control laws, nor to
the condominium regulations promulgated under the authority to regulate the
sale of "an interest or estate" in a condominium unit.80 The Oregon court
clasified right-to-use memberships as "mere contract rights to use unspecified
property."8' Conversely, California's Court of Appeal found the state's land
subdivision sales act applicable to right-to-use timeshares.8 2 Although the
timeshare purchaser had not been entitled to a particular unit, the entitlement
to exclusive occupancy for a specific period of time brought the timeshare
under California's real property law.8 3 Although the specific provisions of the
particular timeshare arrangement in question may be determinative in these
close cases, the divergence of judicial opinion on this issue is clear.84
74. The states are: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, and New Mexico. Id at 25.
75. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 337 to 339-c (McKinney 1916 & Supp. 1984).
76. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. § 30-372a-2A(3) (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-11-4(l)(b)
(1953 & Supp. 1983).
77. Eg., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-33-110 to -111 (1982) (condominium statutes with separate
sections for timeshares apply only to interval and timespan timeshares); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, §§ 591-94 (West Cum. Supp. 1983) (provisions for timeshares within condominium act distin-
guish between timeshare estates and timeshare licenses).
78. 94 Nev. 707, 585 P.2d 1337 (1978).
79. Id at 710, 585 P.2d at 1339 (citation omitted). In 1982, however, the Nevada Attorney
General declared that a right-to-use timeshare is an interest in property and as such is subject to
the Nevada Land Sales Act. PRACTICINo LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32, at 15. In the same year
an opinion by the Texas Attorney General declared that a right-to-use timeshare is not an interest
in real property. Id.
80. Royal Aloha Partners v. Real Estate Div., 59 Or. App. 564, 651 P.2d 1350 (1982).
81. 651 P.2d at 1353 (Or. App.).
82. Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1980) (state act requiring registration of, and public disclosure statements for, subdivisions of real
property).
83. Id. at 458, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The purchaser was given "exclusive occupancy" during
a specific portion of each year "untilprecisely December 31, 2041." Id.
84. Another case, arising in a bankruptcy context, held that a right-to-use timeshare that did
not promise a specific unit was neither an unexpired lease nor an executory contract for the sale of
real property, and gave the purchaser no right in the underlying property. In re Sombrero Reef
Club, Inc., 18 Bankr. 612, 617-19 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
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Instead of depending on these more general regulatory frameworks, the
final form of timeshare regulation specifically regulates timeshares as a distinct
form of sale, subdivision, or security.85 This per se legislation generally entails
a combination of other regulatory methods and covers some combination of
the following: sales practices;8 6 salesperson and project registration;8 7 public
offering statements;8 liens;8 9 partitioning;90 advertising and promotions;91
and project organization and management. 92 Like the other forms of legisla-
tion, per se timeshare laws often distinguish between fee and right-to-use
timeshares; although some portions of most state acts apply to both forms,
other provisions may apply only to one type.93
Although some commentators contend that amendment of existing state
condominium acts might protect timeshare purchasers and owners, or that fee
timeshares are best regulated as condominiums and right-to-use timeshares
under general consumer protection laws, 94 the trend is toward comprehensive
legislation specifically covering timeshare sales and operation.95 Nevertheless,
specific regulation of timeshares varies considerably in comprehensiveness. In
addition to provisions based on the fee and right-to-use distinction, some acts
exclude timeshares from the other means of regulation discussed above,96
while others continue to subject them to multiple regulatory mechanisms. 97
Some states have adopted portions of the three model timesharing acts
that have been drafted, but none of the model acts has been widely accepted.
The Model Time-Sharing Ownership Act,98 known as RTC/NARELLO, is a
"disclosure-type" statute "designed to assure consumer protection while pre-
85. Fourteen states have passed legislation specifically regulating timeshares. They are:
ALA. CODE §§ 34-27-50 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1983); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2197 to -2197.17
(West. Cum. Supp.1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-103w to -103bb (West. Cum. Supp,
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.01 to -.28 (Cum. Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-3-160 to -205
(Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 514E-1 to -15 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -
1741 (1981); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 119A.010 to -.700 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-39 to -57
(Cum Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 94.803 to -.991 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -230
(Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-15B (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-32-101 to -130
(1982); VA. CODE §§ 55-360 to -400 (1981 & Supp. 1983). In most states, the timeshare acts are
administered by the same entity that administers land subdivision controls.
86. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-103 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
87. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-52 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
88. E.g., VA. CODE § 55-374 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
89. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.16 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
90. E.g., Id. § 721.22.
91. Eg., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2197.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
92." E.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 94.846 to .869 (1983).
93. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 55-363 (only transfer of timeshare "estates" may be recorded); id
§9 55-368, 371 (separate management guidelines for timeshare "estates" and "uses" respectively).
94. Comment, supra note 21, at 223; E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 70.
95. Until 1982, only seven states-Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Nebraska, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, and Virginia-had per se legislation. Since 1982, however, Alabama, Connecticut, Geor-
gia, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Oregon have enacted timeshare legislation. See
supra note 85 (statutory cites).
96. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.23 (Supp. 1981) (timeshare not a security); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 94.813 (1983) (timeshare not a security).
97. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-50 (Cum. Supp. 1983) ("investment contract" timeshare is a
security); id. § 93A-46 (advertising and promotions subject to separate consumer protection laws).
98. MODEL TIME-SHARING OWNERSHIP AcT (1974) (Resort TimeSharing Council of the Am.
serving a reasonable commercial atmosphere." 99 This Act, adopted without
change by Nebraska' 00 and with some variation by at least five other states, 101
includes provisions for a public offering statement, a three-day rescission pe-
riod, and a nondisturbance clause, under which the lender, developer, and
buyer agree to protect the purchaser from loss due to default by the developer
and subsequent foreclosure by the lender.10 2 RTC/NARELLO distinguishes
between a "time-share estate" (timeshare coupled with an interest in property)
and "timeshare use" (no attached property interest). Despite this distinction,
however, RTC/NARELLO does not state explicitly whether a right-to-use
timeshare is to be treated as an interest in real estate.
0 3
In 1982 the American Land Development Association drafted a second
model statute, the Model Time-Share Sales Act (MTSA). More comprehen-
sive than RTC/NARELLO, MTSA includes structural guidelines for
timeshare projects, 1°4 provisions controlling advertising and timeshare ex-
change programs,105 and an exemption of most timeshares from securities
laws. 10 6 MTSA also changed the definition of timeshare so that "no distinc-
tion is made between a so-called time-share use and a so-called time-share
estate."' 1 7 Like RTC/NARELLO, MTSA brings all regulatory power over
timesharing under a single state agency, preferably an agency governing real
estate matters. While MTSA has not been adopted by any states, some of its
concepts have been included in state acts.108
The third model act, also more comprehensive than RTC/NARELLO, is
the Uniform Real Estate Time Share Act (URETSA). 10 9 URETSA distin-
guishes between the "time-share estate" and "time-share license" forms of
ownership."10 It characterizes the "time-share license," however, as an estate
Land Dev. Ass'n & Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate License Law Officials) [hereinafter cited as
RTC/NARELLO].
99. Smith, supra note 52, at 34.
100. Bloch, supra note 45, at 24.
101. Id. These states are Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id.
102. Smith, supra note 52, at 35.
103. Pollack, supra note 12, at 296-97.
104. MTSA, supra note 58, art. III. Article III requires a recorded declaration establishing the
basic scheme of ownership, occupancy, and management in accordance with rules and regulations
to be promulgated regarding the creation of an owners' association, the powers of the association,
the powers of hired management, methods of assessing and collecting fees for maintenance and
operating expenses, and requirements for insurance. Id.
105. Id art. VI. Article VI prohibits misleading advertising, requires that all advertisements
be reviewed by the regulatory agency, and restricts certain advertising techniques, especially those
that offer gifts or prizes. Id
106. Id § 1-106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
107. Id § 1-102.
108. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-3-185 to -188 (Supp. 1983) (based on MTSA, art. VI -
Advertising); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-48 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (based on MTSA, Art. V - Exchange
Programs); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 119A.590 to .620 (1983) (loosely based on MTSA, art. V - Ex-
change Programs).
109. UNIFORM REAL ESTATE TIME SHARE AcT (1979) (Nat'l Conference of Commissioners
on Unif. State Law) [hereinafter cited as URETSA]. See also Pollack, supra note 12, at 296.
110. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 46. For comparison of MTSA and URETSA, see
id, at 44-48; Pollack, supra note 12, at 295-301.
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for years with all the incidents that attach to it at common law."' Thus, it
appears that URETSA classifies all timeshares as interests in real property. Of
the states with timeshare legislation, only Oregon has adopted this bifurcated
definition with both types of timeshares classified as real property. 112
URETSA is also broader than the other model acts in that it recognizes both
implied and express warranties of quality, has a seven-day period for rescis-
sion, and establishes a plan for timeshare project management. 13
The North Carolina Time Share Act" 4 includes several features of
MTSA. Most importantly, it defines "time share" without distinguishing be-
tween fee and right-to-use timeshares." 5 Also, like MTSA, it provides for
detailed disclosures regarding vacation exchange programs available to pur-
chasers,' 1 6 and a five-day rescission period during which any money paid is to
be escrowed.1 7 In addition, the North Carolina Act establishes requirements,
procedures, and disciplinary measures for registration of timeshare projects
and salespersons with the North Carolina Real Estate Commission,'" and
requires a public disclosure statement for all timeshare offerings." 19
The Act, however, does not cover many subjects that are included in a
more comprehensive act, such as MTSA and URETSA.' 20 For example, the
North Carolina Act does not address the resale of timeshares, out-of-state
sales, 121 the structure and management of the timeshare project, 122 local regu-
111. Pollack, supra note 12, at 297, 299.
112. OR. REv. STAT. § 94.813 (1983). North Carolina, among other states, has defined
"timeshare" as a single concept and classified it as real property. See infra notes 115, 125, 171.
113. Pollack, sura note 12, at 295-301. Unlike RTC/NARELLO, which requires merely that
management provisions be included in timeshare agreements, URETSA specifically describes
management duties and purchaser involvement in management decisionmaking. Id at 298.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-39 to -57 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
115. "Time share" means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during five or
more separated time periods over a period of at least five years, including renewal op-
tions, whether'bfnot coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years in a time share
project or a specified portion thereof, including, but not limited to, a vacation license,
prepaid hotel reservation, club membership, limited partnership, or vacation bond ....
Id § 93A-41(9).
Under the MTSA:
"Time-share" means the right, however evidenced or documented, to use and oc-
cupy a living unit (either a specifically identified living unit or a living unit of a specific
type or any living unit) which use and occupancy rights are divided among all persons
holding similar interests within that living unit according to a fixed or variable time
schedule on a periodic basis that has been or will be allotted from the use or occupancy
into which the time-share project has been divided. No distinction is made in this Act
between a so-called time-share use and a so-called time-share estate.
MTSA, supra note 58, § 1-102.
116. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-48, -49 (Cum. 1983), with MTSA, supra note 58, art. V.
117. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-45 (Cum. Supp. 1983) with MTSA, supra note 58, §§ 4-
101 to 102.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-40, -52, -53 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
119. Id § 93A-44.
120. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text. Though not modeled exactly on either of
the model acts, several state acts, such as those in Georgia, Florida, Oregon, and Tennessee are
fairly complete. For statutory references, see supra note 85.
121. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-15B-7 (1983) (applies to all timeshares located in
South Dakota or sold in South Dakota). The North Carolina registration requirements apply only
to timeshares located in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Supp. 1983).
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lation of timesharing development, or tort liability of timeshare owners.
Rather than being self-contained, the North Carolina Act delegates some of
the regulatory authority over time shares to administrators other than the Real
Estate Commission; securities violations fall under the jurisdiction of the Sec-
retary of State,' 23 and violations of advertising and promotions laws are inves-
tigated and prosecuted by the Attorney General.' 24 Nowhere does the act
expressly exempt timeshares from the coverage of other laws.
The most significant portion of the North Carolina Act is section 93A-42,
which characterizes all timeshares as interests in real estate. 125 By defining
timeshare to include a periodic right to use "whether or not coupled with a
freehold estate or an estate for years,"126 this provision turns all timeshares,
whether of the fee or right-to-use type, into interests in real estate "governed
by the law of [North Carolina] relating to real estate."' 127 Although insignifi-
cant for those timeshares that always have been considered realty interests,'2 8
this provision subjects arrangements formerly contractual, such as timeshare
licenses and club memberships, to the laws of real property and the rights and
duties incident to ownership of real property. This change, which overrides the
common-law notions that a license to use land is not an interest in land,129 but
rather a mere contract right, 130 has several implications.
First, by statutorily designating right-to-use timeshares as real property
interests, the Act avoids the potential flood of litigation that would result from
a less certain statutory provision. The Act conclusively determines that real
estate laws apply to right-to-use timeshares; if this issue had been litigated, a
North Carolina court probably would have found real estate laws inapplicable
after considering the North Carolina common law' 3' and the decisions of
other states. 132
Second, the Act will promote uniformity of timeshare practices by provid-
ing the same benefits and protections to all timeshare purchasers, regardless
122. MTSA, supra note 58, art. III.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-45(a) (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983). The North Carolina Time
Share Act provides that the North Carolina Securities Act, applies "to time shares deemed to be
investment contracts or to other securities offered with or incident to a time share." Id § 93A-50.
124. Id § 75-15. The Time Share Act requires full compliance with chapter 75 of the North
Carolina General Statutes for advertisements that include the offer of a prize or other inducement.
Id. § 93A-46.
125. Id § 93A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
126. Id § 93A-41(9). For the full text of this definition, see supra note 115.
127. Id § 93A-42(a).
128. See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
129. Hill v. Smith, 51 N.C. App. 670, 277 S.E.2d 542, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 543, 281
S.E.2d 392 (1981) (permission given by licensor without deed of property for wife of decedent to
use house located on land purchased by licensor from decedent's estate was not a life estate but a
mere license, revocable at will of licensor).
130. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
131. Even a leasehold in real estate is treated by North Carolina courts as a "chattel real," or
personal property, except as modified by statute. Moche v. Leno, 227 N.C. 159, 41 S.E.2d 369
(1947); Waddell v. United Cigar Stores, 195 N.C. 434, 142 S.E. 585 (1928). See also supra note 129
and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
1984] PROPER TY 1367
NORTH CAROLIN, LW REVIEW[
of the type purchased. The legislature apparently recognized that the vacation
license was developed primarily as a mechanism to avoid existing land sales
regulation 33 and subjected all timeshare salesmen and projects to registration
requirements.' 34 Consequently, developers and salespersons will be more ac-
countable for their actions; this will shield the prospective purchaser from
fraud or misrepresentation. Also, because there will be no legal incongruities
to consider in forming and purchasing timeshares, a purer economic market
putting consumers on more equal footing with developers will result.
All timeshare purchasers also will now receive the additional protections
of real property ownership, such as registered and insured title t35 and the eq-
uitable remedy of specific performance. With a contractual timeshare, how-
ever, the licensee would have had little right to keep the timeshare if the
developer defaulted or the title were encumbered. 136 In these situations, the
licensee could sue the developer for monetary contractual damages, but this
action would be "only as good as the solvency of the licensor and [would have]
no reference to the land itself.' 137 Since the defaulting developer probably
would be judgment proof, the licensee might collect nothing.
With a real property interest, the purchaser can purchase title insurance
to protect that interest against failure or defect of title. For example, if the
developer conveys the same timeshare to two purchasers, or possesses an en-
cumbered title to the property, the purchaser might not be able to keep the
timeshare. He would, however, recover his loss in insurance regardless of the
developer's financial status. If, however, the developer has good title, but fails
to deliver it as promised, the purchaser may demand specific performance of
the agreement, a remedy granted only in actions involving real property and
unique goods.t 38 Thus, if a developer fails to cede exclusive occupancy of the
unit for the time period purchased, the purchaser can compel performance. 139
In addition, an interest in real property generally may be sold, mortgaged,
leased, or willed, while contractual rights might be more strictly limited.' 40
Under ordinary contract theory, for example, the purchaser's right to his
timeshare unit probably would terminate upon his death, but a property inter-
est timeshare may be willed to whomever the timeshare owner chooses. Simi-
larly, a contract might restrict the resale of a timeshare. By designating the
timeshare as a property interest, however, this kind of restriction probably
would constitute an unlawful restraint on alienation. The inability to sublease
133. Davis, Time Sharing Ownership-Legal and Practical Problems, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1183, 1184 (1974).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
135. Vogel, The Tax Consequences of Time-Sharing, 10 J. REAL EST. TAX. 323, 328 (1983).
Vogel's article is a good general source on the tax implications of timesharing and the differences
between fee and right-to-use timeshares.
136. Davis, supra note 133, at 1185.
137. Note, supra note 10, at 1210.
138. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 795-96 (1973).
139. In the timeshare context, however, this remedy is not as valuable as in other situations,
since the purchaser's possessory period is likely to have passed by the time an action is brought.
140. Note, supra note 10, at 1210.
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or assign often distinguishes vacation licenses from vacation leases, 14 1 but
such a restriction on real property would violate state policy declaring realty
"a basic resource of the people [that] should be made freely alienable and
marketable so far as is practicable."' 42 Given that the constitutional right to
property is also subject to "reasonable regulation for the general welfare,"' 143
however, a less restrictive constraint, such as requiring developer approval of a
proposed sublease or assignment, might be permitted in North Carolina as it
has been elsewhere.' 4
Designation of timeshares as real property interests confers several other
advantages. Although the contractual purchaser receives nothing more than
the use of the unit, the property purchaser acquires an equitable interest in the
property, and may realize a gain upon resale from appreciation in the prop-
erty's value. 145 In addition, the timeshare owner will pay real rather than per-
sonal property taxes, and may deduct these and his mortgage interest
payments from his taxable income.146 Finally, property ownership has an in-
herent status and psychological advantage over a mere rental or contract
right. 147
Although the Timeshare Act is intended to protect the consumer, the clas-
sification of all timeshares as real property may have adverse consequences.
The price of timeshares probably will increase. Because all timeshares are
now considered real property, the developer must employ licensed real estate
salespersons for all timeshares, 48 not just for fee timeshares; these costs, along
141. Pollack, supra note 12, at 285.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-I (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983). A restraint prohibiting the transfer,
sublease, or assignment of real property "is contrary to public policy and void." Williams v.
McPherson, 216 N.C. 565, 566, 5 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1939) (realty conveyed with clause "never to be
sold, bought, or transferred" was void).
143. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
144. See Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 683, 174 Cal. Rptr.
136, 144 (1981) (condominium's requirement that management approve assignments and transfers
is valid, if exercised reasonably).
145. A substantial gain is unlikely, however, since the developer's marketing expenses will
have inflated the original purchase price. Pollack, supra note 12, at 287-88. Many agree that
claiming a timeshare to be a good capital investment is difficult to sustain. "Even using swash-
buckling projections for future inflation and interest rates, timeownership is still likely to take
approximately 20 years to pay for itself against renting equivalent hotel or motel accommoda-
tions." Business Brief Doing Time on Holiday, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 10, 1982, at 81.
146. Vogel, supra note 135, at 336. A tax matter of interest to all timeshare purchasers is the
passage, in 1983, by the North Carolina General Assembly of two statutes declaring that when
real or personal property is owned under a timesharing arrangement but managed by a home-
owner's association or some other managing entity it is to be listed for taxes under the name of the
entity rather than the actual owner. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302(c)(13) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (real
property), and id § 105-306(c)(9) (personal property). Although these statutes will simplify the
paperwork for tax personnel, they might reduce tax revenues to the local government, since the
aggregate value of separately assessed timeshares is usually much higher than the property's in-
dependent value. Timeshare managers may face problems in allocating the tax burden among
timeshare owners and in deciding whether to include tax expenses in annual maintenance fees, to
assess each timeshare owner, or to absorb the expense. For timeshare owners there is the addi-
tional problem of whether property taxes may be deducted for income tax purposes when they are
not assessed directly.
147. Note, supra note 10, at 1211.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (timeshare salesmen must be licensed real
estate agents). Even if salespersons are paid on a commission-only basis, a licensed agent proba-
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with the expenses of complying with disclosure and registration require-
ments,149 likely will be passed on to the purchaser. In addition, the purchaser
will incur the added expenses of purchasing and owning real estate-title
search fees, attorney's fees, and property taxes. The purchaser also will absorb
the risk of damage or destruction to the property, or at least the expense of
insurance. With a contractual relationship, the developer might have retained
these costs.
A final concern is whether the right-to-use arrangements are compatible
with other laws that now govern them. According to the Act, timeshares
"shall be governed by the law of this State relating to real estate,"150 which
includes conveyancing laws,' 51 mortgaging and foreclosure statutes,152 recor-
dation requirements, 15 3 eminent domain powers, ' 5 4 the Uniform Marketabil-
ity of Title Act,155 and the Unit Ownership Act,156 as well as the common law
regarding real property. Although most of these laws present no direct conflict
with the right-to-use form of ownership, and the Act has addressed some of
the conflicts that might arise from applying traditional real estate law to
timeshares, 57 a few potential problem areas remain.
One possible problem not addressed by the Act is presented by the rule
against perpetuities, 158 which invalidates from its creation a future interest in
property if it does not vest "within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years
and ten lunar months thereafter."' 5 9 In North Carolina this rule applies to
bly will demand a larger commission, causing the developer to raise the purchase price
accordingly.
149. Id §§ 93A-40, -52 (application fee for registering timeshare project of up to $1500).
150. Id § 93A-42(a).
151. Id §§ 39-1 to -29 (1976).
152. Id §§ 45-1 to -74 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
153. Id §§ 47-I to -120. Timeshare conveyances, contracts to convey, or leases must be regis-
tered for the buyer to prevail against lien creditors or bona fide purchasers for value. Id § 47-18.
In addition to placing registration and title search duties on timeshare purchasers, and according
them the protection of title registration, this will create a tremendous increase in business in Regis-
trar of Deeds' offices, especially in resort counties.
154. Id §§ 40A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
155. Id §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
156. Id §§ 47A-1 to -37 (controlling the creation, structure, and management of condomini-
ums and the relations among unit owners and with the management).
157. Although difficulties might occur in a tenancy in common situation with partitioning of a
timeshare, the Act expressly prohibits partitioning of the timeshare unit itself. It allows the parti-
tion, by sale, of a single timeshare interest. Id § 93A-43 (Cum. Supp. 1983). For discussion of the
partitioning problems, see generally supra note 21. Also, the Act requires the developer to release
timeshare owners from any liens affecting that timeshare and provides, unless otherwise agreed,
for the severability of liability for liens against more than one timeshare in the project. Id § 93A-
57. This provision entitles the timeshare owner to a release from such a lien "upon payment of the
amount of the lien attributable to his time share." Id Thus, debts of other timeshare owners will
not affect his interest.
158. The rule against perpetuities is still significant in North Carolina law. See generally Link,
The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57 N.C.L. REv. 727 (1979).
159. American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 463, 46 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1948). North
Carolina has a long history of cases holding that restraints on the sale of conveyed property are
void. See, e.g., Pilley v. Sullivan, 182 N.C. 493, 109 S.E. 359 (1921); Stokes v. Dixon, 182 N.C.
323, 108 S.E. 913 (1921); Brooks v. Griffin, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919); Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C.
717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916); Christmas v. Winston, 152 N.C. 48, 67 S.E. 58 (1910); Wool v. Fleetwood,
1370 [Vol. 62
PROPERTY
remainders as well as executory interests, 60 to personal as well as real prop-
erty,161 to sales as well as gratuitous conveyances, 62 and possibly even to
commercial contractual arrangements.1 63
In the timesharing context, the rule might cover units conveyed for the
useful life of the building with a remainder in the grantor or in the purchasers
as tenants in common. Like a life estate, this conveyance is for an indefinite
term; however, it is attached only to the life of a building, which is not consid-
ered "a life or lives in being."''64 Although the life of the building might be
estimable, it is not certain. Since it may last longer than twenty-one years and
ten months plus some life in being, the rule would invalidate the remainder.' 65
Although the rule against perpetuities may have been of concern to purchasers
of conventional condominiums 16 6 and interval timeshares, and possibly to
timeshare licensees depending on the rule's applicability to mere contractual
rights prior to passage of the Act, 167 it is of certain concern now that
timeshares are considered real property.
The rule will necessitate change in either the timeshare documents or in
the Act. If the interest is to revert, the useful life of the building will have to
be estimated and a contingency added to the agreement for the possibility of
early destruction of the building. In this case the agreement would be subject
to two contingencies, one stating a definite time period complying with the
rule, the other exceeding the rule (saying, e.g., "so long as the building shall
stand"). With this arrangement, however, the courts may disregard an "or"
between the two contingencies and "hold that such an interest, if void in part,
is void in toto. ,,168 If the possibility of destruction were ignored in the con-
veyance for a term of years, it surely would conform to the rule; with this
136 N.C. 460, 485 S.E. 785 (1904); see also Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960);
Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
160. Link, supra note 158, at 753.
161. Id See Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962) (rule against perpetuities
applied to stock).
162. Link, supra note 158, at 806. See Hardy Bros. v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890
(1892) (grantor's right of first refusal to repurchase land if grantee should "ever" sell held void as
contrary to rule against perpetuities).
163. Link, supra note 158, at 754, 804-17. Professor Link discusses the propriety of applying
the rule against perpetuities to commercial interests, saying that although the rule is a "fairly
appropriate yardstick for family settlements. . . [it is] not an appropriate unit of measure for most
commercial interests. Often no lives in being can be related to the commercial interest." Id at
807. See Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. 4.6, 38 S.E. 26 (1901) (right to all timber cut by grantee
on grantor's land for five years "from the time [grantee] begins to manufacture said timber into
wood or lumber" invalidated; rule against perpetuities rationale used, though rule not specifically
cited).
164. The lives by which the interest can be measured must be human. Link, supra note 158, at
768.
165. See Farnan v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 110, 139 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1964);
Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 402-03, 113 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1960) (if controlling event might not
occur within period of the rule, or if any uncertainty or doubt exists, limitation is void, whether or
not event actually occurs).
166. See generally Seeber, Condominiums in North Carolina: Improving the Statutory Base, 7
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 359-64 (1971).
167. Id
168. Id at 361.
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possibility, however, the protection to the developer from the claims of pur-
chasers in the event of destruction is limited. The remaining possibility, and
probably the best, is to amend the Timeshare Act to provide that the rule
against perpetuities will not invalidate any instruments thereunder. 169 Until
the Act is so amended, however, those involved in timeshare transactions
should check every instrument for possible violations, and correct these viola-
tions by making the term more definite or stating that it not exceed the rule.170
Although sellers and purchasers of right-to-use timeshares probably have
intended them not to be real property interests, 171 this intent has been based
on expectations nurtured by the prevailing laws. With a change in the law,
expectations eventually will change as well. Some commentators, however,
believe that designating a new interest in real estate will paralyze the
timeshare industry; they argue that people will avoid timeshares because they
do not know what this new interest means. The fee timeshare, however, has
already fit into existing property interests without destroying the state's prop-
erty law or the timeshare industry. Defining all timeshares as real property
merely affords the protections of property ownership to all timeshare owners,
regardless of the particular timeshare arrangement involved.
The other arguments against North Carolina's decision are similarly sur-
mountable. Although the change will lead to a higher price for timeshares,
this increase should be nominal since the developer's increased expenses may
be spread among the purchasers. The problem with the rule against perpetu-
ities is not necessarily new. North Carolina has applied it to nonrealty con-
veyances in the past. In any case, the problem usually can be avoided by
careful drafting, without substantially changing the relationship of the parties
under the conveyance.
In conclusion, the benefits of North Carolina's Act outweigh its detri-
ments. With timeshares considered real property, timeshare owners will be
given the protection of title insurance and registration, the right of specific
performance, and greater freedom of alienability, as well as the other incidents
of real property ownership. The uniform applicability of real property law to
all timeshare interests will foster a greater uniformity of timeshare projects,
once developers and consumers learn how best to comply with the law's re-
169. Id at 362.
170. For a summary of drafting prescriptions that help avoid the rule, see Link, supra note
158, at 817-18.
171. Case law, though sparse, usually has declared that right-to-use timeshares do not consti-
tute real property interests. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. Similarly, most state
statutes distinguish between fee and right-to-use timeshares, defining only the fee form as includ-
ing real property interests, E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Nebraska (except for tax purposes),
Tennessee, and Virginia (except for tax purposes). In addition to MTSA, only five other states
have expressed the same view as North Carolina: California, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Oregon,
and Utah. See supra note 85. Further, commentators express the notion that neither purchasers
nor developers think of timeshares as real estate. "All of the putative advantages of the vacation
license time-share arrangement are founded upon the premise that the interest purchased is not an
interest in real property." E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 22. "But under no circum-
stances do the purchaser and seller of these right-to-use programs intend that this approach will
give rise to what is commonly considered the ownership of land." Vogel, supra note 135, at 327.
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quirements. This uniform applicability will prevent developers from circum-
venting the law merely by structuring the timeshare development as a right-to-
use project.
In addition to declaring timeshares a real property interest, North Caro-
lina has taken another step toward protecting the timeshare purchaser by rec-
ognizing the necessity of enacting per se timeshare legislation. Because
timeshares face problems beyond those of conventional condominiums, con-
dominium laws are insufficient to cover timesharing. Similarly, subdivision
laws, blue sky laws, and general consumer protection laws, while covering
some aspects of timesharing, do not comprehensively regulate the area. Even
if they did, regulation under several different laws and agencies would compli-
cate unnecessarily compliance by a timeshare project.
The substance of North Carolina's Act, however, does not protect con-
sumers completely. The absence of guidelines for the management of
timeshares denies the timeshare owners' right to be represented by manage-
ment. The possibility of applying securities laws to timesharing leaves open
an avenue for litigation that could have been closed by exempting timeshares
from securities laws or by intensifying timeshare registration and disclosure
provisions. In addition, the Act fails to address other problems that are certain
to arise, such as the rule against perpetuities, resale, and out-of-state sales.
Finally, the lack of uniformity in timeshare legislation from state to state,
while not a problem specific to the North Carolina Act, is likely to unnecessa-
rily complicate timeshare sales and operation for interstate developers and
purchasers.
Although the North Carolina Time Share Act is not comprehensive, the
efforts of the North Carolina legislature in enacting it are laudable. The Act
addresses the needs of a growing sector of the population and will eliminate
much of the confusion caused by the multiplicity of timeshare forms and the
questionable promotional techniques of timeshare developers. It should im-
prove relations between timeshare developers and purchasers and provide in-
centive and guidance for the industry to develop in a positive direction.
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